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Representation
Journal of Representative Democracy

ISSN: 0034-4893 (Print) 1749-4001 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrep20

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To cite this article: Jack Lucas (2020) Reaction or Reform? Subnational Evidence on P.R. Adoption from Canadian Cities, Representation, 56:1, 89-109, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2019.1700154

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1700154

REPRESENTATION
2020, VOL. 56, NO. 1, 89–109
https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1700154

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Reaction or Reform? Subnational Evidence on P.R. Adoption from Canadian Cities

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ABSTRACT

While national electoral reforms in the early twentieth century have received considerable attention, subnational adoption of P.R. systems in otherwise 'non-adopting' countries such as Canada have generally been overlooked. The strategic contexts in which these subnational reforms occurred, involving absent or emerging party systems and limited strategic knowledge, provides a new opportunity to test recent arguments about electoral reform, focused on normative ideas and strategic contexts, against an older 'left threat' thesis. Drawing from analyses of new electoral, archival, and news- paper data, this article offers a comparative explanation of urban electoral reform in four of the most important subnational instances of P.R. adoption in Canadian history (Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg). I argue that the 'left threat' thesis cannot explain these cases; instead, P.R. was adopted as a result of a reform coalition for whom electoral reform was an immediate policy objective. I suggest that two recent challenges to the 'left threat' thesis, fit together into a persuasive alternative interpretation of early-twentieth-century electoral reform in the North American subnational context..

KEYWORDS

Urban politics; electoral reform; Canadian politics; proportional representation; single transferable vote

The early twentieth century was the first golden age of electoral reform. By 1930, twenty countries on the European continent, plus Australia and Iceland, had adopted some version of proportional representation, and the universe of democratic electoral systems in advanced industrial states had been permanently transformed. But amidst the transformation, three countries – Canada, Britain, and the United States – stood against the trend, their first-past-the-post electoral systems, then as now, left unchanged (Mackie & Rose, 1991; Pilet, Renwick, Nunez, Reimink, & Simon, 2016).

This, at any rate, is the standard story. In fact, however, while none of the 'ABC' countries (America, Britain, Canada) adopted proportional representation at the national level, P.R. systems *were* adopted in all three countries at the subnational scale. These reforms included local elections in Northern Ireland and Scotland along with P.R. elections in dozens of municipalities and school boards throughout the United States (Farrell & McAllister, 2000; Hoag & Hallett, 1926).

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Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1700154

Nowhere was this subnational enthusiasm for P.R. keener than in western Canada. Every major city from the Ontario border westward adopted the single transferable vote between 1915 and 1930, as did several urban ridings in two of western Canada's four provinces. This western Canadian experiment remains the deepest engagement with proportional representation ever attempted in Canada, Britain, or the United States. It affords an excellent opportunity to understand the dynamics of early electoral reform, for which an extensive literature in the standard 'adopting' countries is now well established, within an important 'non-adopting' country in the same period.

In this article, I focus on P.R. adoption in the four largest cities in western Canada: Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, and Winnipeg. Each city adopted P.R. in the early twentieth century, and the system persisted in two cities, Calgary and Winnipeg, for longer than nearly anywhere else in North America (Johnston & Koene, 2000).[1] The four Canadian cities served as inspiration for the P.R. movement in the United States and as fodder for P.R. debates at the provincial and federal levels in Canada. They were important and inspiring early cases of P.R. adoption in all of the 'ABC' countries.[2]

Drawing on systematic newspaper, electoral, and archival data, I argue that a 'Rokkanian' interpretation of western Canadian electoral reform – as a strategic response by business elites to an emerging labour threat – cannot explain P.R. adoption in these cases (Boix, 1999; Pilon, 2006; Rokkan, 1970). Instead, P.R. was advocated and implemented by a reform coalition for whom proportional representation was primarily an immediate policy objective, part of a larger package of interrelated democratic reforms. I begin with a comparative analysis of Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver, and then show that Winnipeg – typically held to be a quintessential case of reactionary reform by incumbent elites (Johnston & Koene, 2000; Pilon, 2006; Wichern, 1976) – actually fits comfortably within my alternative argument. These findings, I argue, serve as an additional piece of evidence in favour of a more localised approach to electoral reform, one that also appreciates the normative context in which electoral reform often occurs. While this argument may have implications for the study of electoral reform in 'marquee' cases of national PR adoption in western Europe, my argument is particularly important for those who wish to understand electoral reforms outside the national legislatures of major European states – dozens of instances of which occurred across Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the early twentieth century.

Electoral Reform: Coalitions, Ideas, and Uncertainty

Why was electoral reform so common in the early twentieth century? For years, our answer to this question was dominated by the work of Stein Rokkan, who focused on a single decisive factor: socialist threat (Rokkan, 1970). Established parties were willing to adopt P.R., Rokkan argued, because of an emerging threat from socialist parties and an unwillingness to join forces with rival incumbents. Rokkan's argument was subsequently formalised and tested by Carles Boix (1999), whose own analysis was successfully replicated by Markus Kreuzer (2010). In the Canadian context, the Rokkanian argument has been taken up with vigor by Dennis Pilon, who argues that Canadian P.R. adoption originated in concerns about an emerging labour threat and was 'sponsored by the very forces most indifferent to it previously: political parties, business elites, and those holding the reins of government' (Pilon, 2006, p. 148; also Pilon, 1996; Pilon, 2013).

On a Rokkanian interpretation, proportional representation was adopted in Canadian cities as a rearguard action by business elites who sought to preserve a place for themselves in the council chamber while keeping the emerging labour movement from capturing a majority of council seats.[3]

Despite apparently strong support for Rokkan's argument in the subsequent work of Boix, Kreuzer, and Pilon, the 'left threat' thesis has come under sustained challenge in the past decade. This challenge has come in two main flavours.[4] The first is a new emphasis on *normative ideas* related to electoral reform. As André Blais and his coauthors have argued, P.R. became popular in the early twentieth century because, quite simply, it had 'come to be considered the most 'democratic' electoral system' (Blais, Dobrzynkska, & Indridason, 2005, p. 183). Blais finds that the 'socialist threat' variable is no longer statistically significant once regional democratic trends (capturing normative pressure) and pre-existing institutional structures (capturing the strategic differences that result from plurality versus majority systems) are included in a model of PR adoption in Europe. This argument – namely, that P.R. adoption depends on the normative salience of electoral reform within wider democratic debates – has also been advanced by students of more recent electoral reform, such as Pippa Norris (2011) and Alan Renwick (2010). Damien Bol (2016) has built on these arguments with a policy-seeking model of reform in which support for P.R. is related to a party's ongoing policy commitments to democratic inclusion.

A second challenge to the Rokkanian thesis concerns the strategic dimension of electoral reform. The strategic calculations required by the Rokkanian argument are demanding: an awareness of the changing preferences or composition of the electorate; an understanding of the likely consequences of these changes within status quo electoral institutions; a forecast of the likely consequences of the same changes under an alternative electoral system; and a willingness to bear the risks involved in trading the status quo for a much less certain alternative (J. B. Pilet & Bol, 2011; Shvetsova, 2003). Even today, reliable information on the likely strategic implications of electoral reform is often disputed and party elites are often skeptical about easy forecasts of future results (Andrews & Jackman, 2005; Pilet, 2008).

Rather than grand, Rokkanian strategizing, therefore, several recent scholars have argued that political actors are likely to pursue much more 'local' strategies, incorporating strategic information that is much more temporally or spatially proximate. Some have developed parsimonious models of this local strategizing (Benoit, 2004; Colomer, 2005; Shugart, 2008), while others have explored how a range of 'local' considerations affect preferences about reform (Calvo, 2009; Leemann & Mares, 2014). In an in-depth analysis of German PR adoption, for example, Leemann and Mares (2014) translate the Rokkan argument to the district scale, demonstrating how a local left-threat combined with aggregate seat-vote disproportionality to generate support or opposition to PR adoption; this approach does not deny the force of the left threat in some circumstances, but builds a model that is sensitive to local strategic variation rather than insisting on a single overarching 'left threat' logic. In the American context, Jack Santucci (2017) has applied a similarly localised strategic logic to the study of urban P.R. adoption. Pilet and Bol (2011) have explored the importance of these considerations for electoral reform preferences, demonstrating that success under a status quo system makes parties less interested in electoral reform, even if such reform is expected to increase the party's seat share. While the

level of local strategic calculation and the level of historical detail that these authors incorporate into their models varies, they nonetheless represent a collective move toward models of strategic calculation in which political actors incorporate much more 'local' information into their decisions about electoral reform.

In this article, I combine these two recent developments in electoral reform research to explain P.R. adoption in large western Canadian cities. In these cities, I argue, P.R. adoption was primarily a first-order policy goal, one that sat comfortably alongside women's suffrage, direct democracy, and one-person-one-vote as a normative indicator of inclusion and democratic progress. It was sponsored not by incumbent conservatives or business elites, but by a remarkably diverse reform coalition. This policy-oriented and normative basis for reform was possible because of the deep strategic uncertainty that local political actors faced when thinking about electoral reform. As local actors learned more about the actual operation of the P.R. system, filling in their 'local' strategic knowledge, I show that more strategic considerations became prominent in each city. On this approach, strategic uncertainty creates room for normative policy-seeking goals to have a considerable influence on processes of electoral reform. The peculiar strategic environment of western Canadian cities reveals these factors in a way that few national-level cases, which much more clearly established strategic environments, could do, further illustrating the value of subnational and disaggregated analytical approaches to the study of electoral and democratic reform (Mares, 2015; Santucci, 2017).

Case Selection and Method

This article focuses on four Canadian cities: Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, and Winnipeg. While attention to Canadian electoral reform has been limited, these four cities are the most important and widely discussed cases of P.R. adoption in Canadian history, measured both by scholarly attention (Jansen, 1998; Johnston & Koene, 2000; Pilon, 2006) and and by the consistent attention of P.R. enthusiasts in other Anglo-American countries (Hoag & Hallett, 1926). In the early twentieth century, the four cities served as rapidly growing hubs in the Canadian resource economy, receiving tens of thousands of new immigrants (both from elsewhere in Canada and from abroad) and exploding from small outposts into substantial urban centres often in the space of a single decade.

In making my argument, I am constrained by the small overall number of available cases and the absence of comparable non-adopting cities in western Canada. I address these constraints in two ways. First, I focus on an internally comparative approach among the four cities, with a particular focus on comparing Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver to Winnipeg, a case that appears on its face to clearly support Rokkan, given that business elites seem to have imposed PR in that city over the objections of the city's labour leaders. Second, I dig deeply into a range of data sources in each of the case cities. These include complete municipal election results in each city, gathered from archival materials and newspapers; council voting records on proportional representation and other democratic reform measures from 1900 to 1930; and newspaper coverage in each city, from both major local dailies, of every council communication, motion, vote, and plebiscite on electoral reform from 1900 to 1930. In addition to these systematic sources, I have consulted provincial and federal Hansard and archival materials, the public and private correspondence of all of the actors involved in electoral reform in each city whose papers are

available, and the Canadian correspondence and publications of the Proportional Representation League, the most important P.R. advocacy organisation in North America in the early twentieth century. On its own, each of these sources is imperfect and partial. Taken together, however, they allow us to test the plausibility of each of the arguments described above with considerable rigour.

PR Adoption in Western Canadian Cities

The cities of Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, and Winnipeg adopted the single transferable vote (STV) – universally called 'Proportional Representation' across North America during this period – in rapid succession during and immediately after the First World War (Hoag & Hallett, 1926). In Calgary, P.R. advocates made quick work of electoral reform, requesting an amendment to the city charter, persuading council to submit a P.R. plebiscite to the ratepayers, and adopting, in 1917, just the second P.R. system in North America. The process of P.R. adoption in Edmonton, Vancouver, and Winnipeg was somewhat more difficult than in Calgary, but by the early 1920s, all four cities had a proportional system in place. For P.R. advocates in North America, western Canada was a constant inspiration, a harbinger of P.R.'s inevitable spread across the continent.[5]

What prompted this explosion of reform? Was it a strategic response by business elites to the growing labour movement? To answer these questions, we need to systematically investigate *who* supported and opposed proportional representation, the *grounds* for their support or opposition, and the *strategic considerations* involved in patterns of support or opposition during each city's early encounter with the proportional representation system.

Coalitions of Support and Opposition

First, then, who supported and opposed PR? Local newspaper and archival data allow us to answer this question at three levels: patterns of support and opposition at the level of *local organizations and activists*, within *city councils*, and among the *general public*. Beginning with the broad organisational landscape, Table 1 outlines the results of a systematic analysis of newspaper coverage of electoral reform in each city; the table notes the name, position for or against, and number of newspaper mentions of every actor or organisation who publicly intervened in P.R. debates in each city. I provide full detail on newspaper sources, as well as sources on each actor and organisation, in online Appendix B.

In Calgary, the P.R. 'debate' was entirely one-sided; every actor and organisation that publicly intervened in the discussion was supportive of reform. Leading the local advocacy was the Calgary P.R. League, a diverse association of middle-class professionals (civil servants, lawyers, a school principal, a judge), progressive-leaning members of the Liberal Party, and members of the emerging farmer and labour movements, including some who would go on to become national leaders in Canadian farmer and labour politics. 'Proportional representation is not a fad,' wrote the Calgary *Albertan* in 1916, 'and it has not and likely will not find its way into party politics. In Calgary it is supported by members of all parties' ('No Title', 1916). Contrary to the *Albertan's* prediction, proportional representation *would* eventually find its way into party politics, though it had not yet done so in 1916. But the newspaper's description of the local environment was correct. The Calgary P.R. League was a diverse and multipartisan coalition.

Table 1. Actors and Organizations Involved in P.R. Debates.

Name	Position	Mentions	Description
Calgary			
P.R. League	For	3	Proportional representation advocacy
Fred Moyer	For	1	
William Irvine	For	1	
A.J. Samis	For	1	
W.D. Spence	For	5	
W.M. Davidson	For	1	
S.B. Hillocks	For	1	Conservative M.L.A.
Edmonton			
Citizens' League	Against	1	Pro-business quasi-party in Edmonton
Civil Service Association	For	1	Labour organisation
John D. Hunt	For	4	Individual citizen
W.D. Spence	For	1	Former City Clerk, Calgary
Trades and Labor Council	For	2	Labour organisation
Vancouver			
Board of Trade	Mixed	2	Local business/trade organisation
B.C. *P*.R. League	For	3	Local/provincial*P*.R. advocacy group
Capt. W.J. Conway	For	2	
Dr. J.W. Robertson	For	1	
Dr. McConkey	For	2	
Dr. McIntosh	For	1	
Dr. Robert Telford	For	3	
Dr. T.*P*. Hall	For		
Garfield King	For	5	
Central Ratepayers' Association	For	1	Ratepayers association for city core
Great War Veterans Association	For	1	Veterans association
Local Council of Women	For	1	Women's organisation
New Era League	For	1	Women's organisation
Rotary Club	For	2	Service organisation
T.H. Kirk	Against	1	Leader of opposition to*P*.R. on Council
Trades and Labor Council	For	2	Labour organisation
Women's Forum	For	1	Women's organisation

In Edmonton, the P.R. debate was less one-sided than in Calgary, with a local organisation of business elites, the 'Citizens' League,' generally opposed to P.R. adoption. The most significant pro-adoption voices in Edmonton were John Hunt, a high-ranking provincial civil servant, Alfred Farmilo, a prominent labour leader, and Colonel C.Y. Weaver, a World War One veteran and progressive-minded Conservative. Here, too, the pro-adoption coalition was multi-partisan and composed primarily of middle-class professionals and members of the labour and farmer movements. labour leaders played a more prominent role in the P.R. adoption debates in Edmonton than in Calgary, which helps to explain the Citizens' League's opposition to the proposal, but in general the opposition was quiet and modest. At the time of adoption, organisational positioning on P.R. in Edmonton was overwhelmingly in the pro-adoption camp.

Vancouver's organisational landscape was similar to Calgary and Edmonton, with a proadoption coalition composed primarily of middle-class professionals, progressive Liberals, and labour leaders (Johnston & Koene, 2000; Pilon, 1996). In Vancouver, however, the labour movement was less well established than in the other cities, which meant that middleclass professionals were more prominent in the movement. In fact, after some hesitation and considerable cajoling, even the Vancouver Board of Trade, a business association, passed a resolution in support of electoral reform (Appendix A.3.1). In general, then, Vancouver's P.R. coalition resembled Calgary and Edmonton, albeit with a wider overall base of support and a less prominent role for labour groups.

Turning from the broad organisational landscape to the city councils in each city, we are immediately faced with an unfortunate challenge of data availability. Council roll calls were recorded only in rare circumstances in western Canadian cities early in the twentieth century, and because local elections were non-partisan, we do not have sufficient information about elected representatives to properly interpret the few roll calls that *are* recorded. It is possible, however, to reconstruct a number of key council votes on electoral reform using council minutes and newspaper coverage of council meetings; these votes can then be combined with biographical data from archival and newspaper material to provide information on the kinds of councillors who supported and opposed P.R. adoption. For instance, even if a councillor ran for municipal office as an independent, they may have run for provincial or federal office around the same time, providing us with information about their partisan complexion.[6] These reconstructed roll call data suggest that labour representatives on city council, to the extent that they were present at all (none had been elected in Vancouver), consistently supported P.R. adoption, while those who were associated with business-oriented coalitions were divided on electoral reform. In Vancouver, city council was generally more skeptical about reform than in Edmonton and Calgary, and the breadth of the organisational coalition that supported reform in Vancouver was a direct response to this more skeptical council. Thus the roll call data, while thin, suggest that the pro-adoption coalition on council resembled the organisational coalitions described above: multipartisan, middle-class, and open to members of the labour and other contemporary movements.

A final angle on support and opposition to electoral reform comes from voting patterns among the general public. Since each city held a plebiscite on P.R. adoption, we can examine the plebiscite returns for clues about how voters themselves viewed electoral reform. The answer, in all three cities, is overwhelming support. In Edmonton, P.R. was not only endorsed by an overwhelming majority, it was also supported by at least 60 percent of voters in *every polling station* in the city. The same was true in Vancouver, where voters in every polling station endorsed P.R. with overwhelming majorities (Appendix A.3.2). Poll-by-poll results in Vancouver suggest very little geographic variation in support, with support ranging from about 60 to 75 percent. In Calgary – the only city for which poll-level data on both plebiscite support and vote choice are available – patterns of plebiscite support align closely with the elite-level coalitions we have identified above. In Figure 1, I plot support for the franchise plebiscite by polling station along with support for the two municipal candidates who were endorsed by the local labour movement. While support for PR adoption was uniformly high, the relationship within the figure is obvious: in districts with higher support for labour candidates, support for PR adoption was especially high.[7] The franchise expansion plebiscite had been advocated and supported by a coalition of middle-class professionals and leaders of the labour movement. These patterns of support appear to have been present at the level of individual voters as well.

Overall, then, electoral reform was advocated in Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver by a coalition whose core was a combination of middle-class professionals and representatives of the movements whose power and voice was growing rapidly in the postwar years: women, farmers, soldiers, and labour. Surprisingly, given the redistributive character of electoral institutions, resistance to reform was rare; when it did appear, it was drawn largely from nervous aldermen and conservative pro-business groups. Business leaders could occasionally be persuaded to join the P.R. coalition, as in Vancouver, but their



Figure 1. Support for Franchise Expansion and Labour Candidates in Calgary, by Polling District.

support was less enthusiastic, less central to the movement, and more fleeting. At the organisational level, the city council level, and the level of the mass public, we have found little to suggest that business elites were among the leaders, let alone the 'sponsors', of electoral reform.

Coalition Dynamics and Ideational Glue

Having identified the coalitions of support and opposition to P.R. in Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver, we now need to understand the arguments that held these coalitions together (Béland & Cox, 2015). To do so, I have identified every argument for and against proportional representation printed in the two largest daily newspapers in each city from 1900 to 1930. These arguments include both newspaper editorials and the recorded arguments of the actors themselves; fortunately, early-twentieth-century newspaper articles tended to describe public meetings at length, providing very good information about arguments for and against P.R. in each city. I have coded each argument by position, actor, and by an inductively-generated list of argument types. Each of the arguments in favour of proportional representation in Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver are summarised in Table 2. Cell numbers are a simple count of the appearance of each argument in the newspaper. I provide full detail on data sources and coding strategy, along with a description and complete sources for each argument type, in Online Appendix D.[8]

In general, electoral reform arguments in western Canadian cities fell into two general clusters, which we might call the 'municipal reform' cluster and the 'democratization' cluster. Municipal reform arguments resembled those for other popular reforms of the day, such as city manager systems and commission government: a higher calibre of

Table 2. Arguments for Proportional Representation.

ID	*P.R.* is good because …	Calgary	Edmonton	Vancouver	Winnipeg	Total
1	… it ensures representation of all opinions/groups/areas	5	7	5	1	18
2	… it ensures proportionality of results to seats	2	3	5	1	11
3	… it eliminates wards	1		6		7
4	… it leads to higher quality candidates	1	1	3		5
5	… it is an innovative/scientific system	3	1	1		5
6	… it prevents strategic voting problems	4				4
7	… it eliminates machines and electioneering		1	2		3
8	… it prevents minority rule		2		1	3
9	… it creates higher turnout and voter engagement		1	1		2
10	… it ensures more moderate labour voices on council				2	2
11	… it is morally right and/or generally good	2				2
12	… it gives voters more freedom and/or more choices	1	1			2
13	… it is simpler and clearer for voters	2				2
14	… it makes representatives more independent		1		1	2
15	… it has good policy effects	1				1
	TOTAL	22	18	23	6	69

elected officials (argument 4 in the table), reduced corruption (argument 7), and an embodiment of the city's innovation and progress (argument 5). In Vancouver, reform-minded locals also appreciated that P.R. would replace wards with an at-large system, another popular municipal reform of the day (argument 3), though this also meant more resistance from aldermen who were accustomed to ward elections (Appendix A.3.3). All of these arguments were broadly in keeping with the American P.R. movement, whose ties to municipal reform were deep and longstanding (Hoag & Hallett, 1926; Santucci, 2017).

Unlike municipal reforms such as commission government, however, P.R. debates also involved a second important cluster of arguments related to the basic operation of local democracy. The first of these (argument 1) was that society, and particularly urban society, had recently changed, creating a true diversity of political opinions and ideas. This diversity called for representation. 'A man needs 17 faces and a rubber neck to represent all classes of his constituents,' said C.W. Andrews, a western Canadian Member of Parliament. 'It is quite impossible for one man adequately to represent all classes of his constituents' (Appendix A.3.4). Far better, Andrews argued, to create multi-member districts in which each opinion group would receive representation in the legislature. This was especially true of the groups whose political dissatisfaction had created such turmoil in the postwar years: labour, soldiers, women, and farmers. Again and again, P.R. advocates argued that minorities were disenfranchised and powerless, their vote swamped by their more dominant opponents. This, they argued, could be overcome by a more proportional system.

A related argument (argument 2), which is still familiar in electoral reform debates today, was even simpler: proportional representation would produce a fairer, more proportional relationship between *vote share* and *seat share* in city councils. 'Under proportional representation,' argued Dr. Robert Telford, a Vancouver P.R. enthusiast, 'each section of political thought would secure representation in proportion to its numerical strength' ('No Title', 1917). Telford's argument was echoed by P.R. supporters in each of the case cities. This 'democratization' cluster of arguments, focused on representation and proportionality in a diverse postwar urban society, was central to P.R. advocacy in each of the four cities.

Arguments against P.R., surveyed in Table 3, reflected a broad mix of practical concerns and normative commitments. These arguments were more varying and scattered than their opponents. Some argued that the present system was perfectly acceptable (argument 6), that the P.R. system was too complicated (argument 4), and that council had higher priorities than electoral reform (argument 1). Others articulated a deeper critique, arguing that proportional representation would *create* partisan and class conflict on council (arguments 7 and 13) and would give small minorities outsize influence over council decisions (argument 2). In a few cases, critics went further, arguing that municipal government was a business designed to serve property owners and that proportional representation would unduly strengthen tenants who had less interest in efficient municipal government (argument 5).[9] In summary, then, arguments for and against P.R. in western Canadian cities suggest two basic motivations for reform, the first related to a standard municipal reform desire to increase the quality and efficiency of city government, and the second built on a commitment to democratic inclusion in the changing postwar city. Both arguments were important for holding together the coalition of P.R. activists in each city, but the more important of the two – the most common among supporters and the argument to which opponents most strenuously objected – was the latter. P.R. was widely understood as an instrument for democratic inclusion, one that was closely linked to women's suffrage, direct democracy, and the elimination of plural voting. It was understood in much the same way by opponents, who recognised that a proportional system would mean representation on council for previously excluded opinions, parties, and groups.[10]

What About Strategy?

How is it possible that a diverse and multifaceted reform coalition supported electoral reform, given the obvious redistributive and strategic character of electoral institutions? To answer this question, we need to begin by outlining the two factors that combined to make strategic calculation much less important in western Canadian cities than one might have expected: *knowledge of electoral systems* and the *local institutional context*.

First, to put the point rather bluntly, local actors in western Canadian cities – including many leading P.R. advocates – knew very little about how P.R. actually worked. To

Table 3. Arguments Against Proportional Representation.

ID	P.R. is bad because …	Calgary	Edmonton	Vancouver	Winnipeg	Total
1	… it is not a priority for city council	2	3			5
2	… it leads to minority rule		4			4
3	… it failed elsewhere		2	1		3
4	… it's not practical/too complicated		1	2		3
5	… it weakens ratepayers/strengthens tenants			2		2
6	… the status quo system is working fine	1	1			2
7	… it creates class/special interest government		1	1		2
8	… it weakens geographic representation		1			1
9	… the process of adoption is procedurally problematic	1				1
10	… it requires abolition of wards			1		1
11	… it produces results that are unclear/contestable	1				1
12	… it creates strategic voting problems	1				1
13	… it is inappropriate for nonpartisan municipal govenrnment			1		1
14	… it will not increase candidate quality			1		1
15	… it is immoral			1		1
	TOTAL	6	13	10	0	29

calculate the effects of electoral reform requires more than the knowledge that one system is 'more proportional' than another; the differences between, say, STV and list-PR are profound. But local debates in western Canada were focused almost exclusively on the distinction between 'P.R.' and the status quo. P.R. advocates regularly cited as examples places which did not in fact have P.R. systems, grouped together places with widely varying P.R. systems, and demonstrated very limited knowledge about the operation of P.R. systems elsewhere in Canada (Appendix A.3.5). Local leaders on both sides sent last-minute letters to officials in P.R. cities, especially Calgary, seeking basic information about STV and its effects (Appendix A.3.6).

This general lack of detailed knowledge about P.R. combined with a second and even more important constraint: the unclear and unstable conditions of the Canadian *municipal* context. As I have mentioned above, political parties in western Canadian cities ranged from nonexistent to embryonic during the P.R. adoption years. Provincial and federal parties were not directly involved in municipal politics, and local parties like Labour or the 'Citizens' League' had only just begun to emerge. Figure 2 provides an overview of the proportion of explicitly partisan candidates in municipal election and city, with the arrival of the P.R. system marked in a dashed line in each figure.[11] The partisan system was either nonexistent (Calgary and Vancouver) or just emerging (Edmonton and Winnipeg) at the time of reform. To calculate the strategic effects of electoral reform in the Canadian urban context was to seek to solve an equation in which nearly all of the variables were unknowns.

One clear indicator of the uncertain strategic context of urban politics is the relative absence of 'counterfactual' arguments in electoral reform debates during this period. Those who follow electoral reform discussions today are familiar with the standard counterfactual claims about legislative composition; 'rather than winning just twenty seats,' the



Figure 2. Proportion of Partisan Candidates in Municipal Elections.

argument goes, 'party (x) would have won fifty.' Such arguments were almost completely absent in western Canadian cities. At the provincial and federal levels, where parties competed for power, the standard counterfactual arguments and examples of 'perverse' results were common (Appendix A.3.7). At the municipal level, however, amidst hundreds of newspaper articles, dozens of pamphlets and reports, and hundreds of pieces of private correspondence, I have found just one instance, scribbled on the back of a piece of scrap paper by a local actor in Winnipeg, of a clear attempt to undertake such a calculation (Appendix A.3.8). Attempts to seek information with which to make these calculations often resulted in frustration and bewilderment; in one case, for instance, a frustrated City Clerk in Calgary responded to an inquiry by simply stating that it is 'impossible to obtain a definite idea as to the relative voting strength of the different groups' in Calgary (Appendix A.3.9). The absence of party labels with which to make these seat share calculations meant that strategic partisan thinking was typically replaced by more abstract arguments about representation of the various 'groups,' 'classes,' and 'opinions' that existed in Canadian cities.

The combination of low knowledge and uncertain local partisan conditions meant that clear-eyed strategic calculation was both difficult and rare. But this is not to deny that political elites who were involved in electoral reform debates were *interested* in making strategic calculations, and they did so with enthusiasm when sufficient information was available. In fact, despite the general absence of strategic thinking noted above, strategic considerations did enter into western Canadian electoral reform debates in two important ways.

First, considerable evidence supports the view that some members of pro-reform coalitions were motivated by the hope that successful municipal reform would make provincial reform more likely. This was especially true in Vancouver, where enthusiasm for reform originated in what Shugart (2001) would call an 'extreme' electoral result: the 1912 provincial election in which the B.C. Liberal Party received 25 percent of votes but was completely shut out of the legislature (Elections BC, 1988). The Liberal Party responded by adding proportional representation to its 1914 platform, and many P.R. advocates in Vancouver hoped that local adoption would serve as a first step to provincial reform. 'The ultimate object of all our propaganda,' said Garfield King, the local P.R. leader in Vancouver, 'is to secure [P.R.] adoption in Dominion and provincial elections. That is where the full flower will be seen' (Appendix A.3.10; also Johnston & Koene, 2000; Pilon, 1996). This provincial interest may also have been present in Alberta, though the evidence in that province is more limited; what is clear in Alberta is that provincial and municipal P.R. debates influenced one another throughout the 1920s (Appendix A.3.11 and Jansen, 1998). Thus what we might call a 'multilevel' strategic dimension is important for understanding why some leading P.R. advocates, such as Garfield King in Vancouver, were enthusiastic about municipal reform. Second, local political elites clearly incorporated strategic considerations into their thinking once they had the knowledge with which to do so. This usually required direct experience with STV. In Vancouver, defeated candidates helped to initiate the petition that ultimately led to the repeal of municipal P.R. (Appendix A.3.12). In Edmonton, when local pro-business politicians realised that P.R. would produce consistent labour representation on council, they turned strongly against the system (Appendix A.3.13). Edmonton's labour leaders were equally informed by strategic learning. The year after P.R. was abolished in Edmonton, in a wonderful irony,

labour's 37 percent vote share produced the first labour seatshare majority in the city's history. Since the old plurality system had given labour 'control of the city council for the first time,' wrote a local correspondent to George Hallett, Secretary of the Proportional Representation League, 'you can understand it would be quite a proposition to convince Labor people of this city that P.R. was best for Labor' (Appendix A.3.14).

In summary, then, political actors in western Canadian cities hardly refused to consider the strategic implications of electoral reform. We have good archival evidence to show that strategic calculations were important, both in the multilevel context and as local leaders learned more about how the system actually worked. While local leaders could speak in the broadest terms about the consequences of reform (more 'minority representation', for instance), more detailed strategic calculation was difficult; this constraint, combined with the fact that P.R. was deeply interwoven with other democratic reforms of the day, meant that shared reform commitment was more important than second-order strategic objectives in binding together the coalitions that pushed for reform in each city. Labour was always an important member of the pro-reform coalition, but debates about electoral reform and labour typically had more to do with labour's *presence* on council than with a perceived threat of a labour majority – it was only many years after P.R. adoption that labour actually threatened majority control of council in any of the case cities.[12] To the extent that reform debates revolved around labour's role in local politics, those debates were about inclusion rather than majority control.

Winnipeg: The Hard Case?

We now turn to Winnipeg, a city whose P.R. adoption story appears to refute, or at least to seriously complicate, the argument I have made thus far. In Winnipeg, the vote to adopt P.R. was *opposed* by labour aldermen on council and *supported* by representatives of the city's business elite. It was described at the time, and occasionally in the years that followed, as a devious plot by the city's business elites (Appendix A.4.1). It has been similarly interpreted by most historians, and serves as a core element of Dennis Pilon's Rokkanian interpretation of Canadian P.R. adoption (Johnston & Koene, 2000, p. 213; Pilon, 2006, p. 145; Wichern, 1976, p. 22). In Winnipeg, it would appear, business elites did indeed adopt PR in the face of a 'left threat,' at the very moment that Labour might have otherwise threatened to take hold of majority control on city council. As we will see, however, this common interpretation rests on a mistaken understanding of what happened in Winnipeg in 1920. Despite the apparent difficulties, the Winnipeg case actually fits comfortably within the argument that I have made above.

What is crucial to understand about P.R. adoption in Winnipeg, in contrast to the other cities, is that it took place in the aftermath of the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike, the most dramatic and violent urban labour action in Canada's history (Bercuson, 1990). The city's municipal election later in 1919 – the most closely watched and bitterly contested municipal race ever to occur in Canada – resulted in a council that was evenly divided between prolabour and pro-business aldermen (Appendix A.4.2). It was within this explosive context that the movement for democratic reform occurred.

Amidst this contentious environment, each side developed a package of reform proposals. Labour pushed for an at-large system, proportional representation, and the abolition of plural voting in favour of 'one person, one vote' (Appendix A.4.3). Winnipeg's

pro-business party, the Citizens' League, responded with its own list of proposals: enfranchising the spouses of property owners, thereby boosting the property vote by about 35,000; forty aldermen elected annually, thus maximising the plural vote (votes for individuals in *each* of the wards in which they own property); a mayor appointed from among the aldermen, thus again maximising the plural vote; and total disenfranchisement of the (overwhelmingly working class) residents who could not read or speak English (Appendix A.4.4).

The situation quickly became explosive. On one side was the Citizens' League, armed with a legislative package that would return the city to the property-dominated years of the late nineteenth century (Artibise, 1975). On the other side was labour, which had abandoned all compromise in favour of an full-adult-suffrage-or-war bargaining position (Appendix A.4.5). Those who were hoping for a middle course between the two extremes, such as J.W. Dafoe, editor of the *Manitoba Free Press*, were annoyed by the spectacle. 'The trouble is,' wrote the *Free Press*, 'that labor, on the one hand, the the Citizens League on the other have each been trying, through their representatives or supposed representatives on city council, to secure an advantage through changes in the electoral system' (Dafoe, 1920). Against the two extremes, the *Free Press* proposed a compromise solution: three wards, thus reducing but not eliminating plural voting, six aldermen per ward, and proportional representation to ensure representation of all local classes and groups.[13]

At first, the *Free Press* proposals seemed little more than armchair institutional engineering, but about a week later – after the controversy had moved from city council to the provincial Law Amendments Committee – the proposal reappeared. In an attempt to broker a compromise between the two sides – a brokerage process that has been almost completely overlooked or misinterpreted by scholars – two members of the provincial committee suggested the *Free Press* model: no formal change to the franchise, but three wards (to reduce plural voting) and proportional representation (Appendix A.4.6).

The proposals were rejected by the city's labour representatives, who stuck with their suffrage-or-nothing strategy (and in doing so, created the lasting impression that they were opposed to PR adoption). They were grudgingly accepted by the Citizens' League, who, while never keen on proportional representation, recognised the advantages of the other provisions (Appendix A.4.7). When the new package came to city council a few days later, it passed on an 8–6 vote. Some labour aldermen dismissed the package as a 'camouflage of the Citizens' league proposals,' but one, J.W. Wiginton, decided that it was a fair compromise and did not want to pass up the opportunity to endorse proportional representation, which he had long advocated (Appendix A.4.8).

Despite first appearances, then, it is not at all clear that the Winnipeg case is supportive of a Rokkanian account of P.R. adoption. Not once in any available public or private source – including newspaper materials, the public and private correspondence of key Citizens' League organisers, and records of council communications and debates – do we find a Citizens' League representative speaking in favour of proportional representation; it was seen as helping Labour rather than the League in local elections. Nor do we find any labour representatives speaking out against P.R. during the 1920 reform controversy; their stance was that no reform was acceptable in the absence of a one-person-one-vote adult franchise (Appendix A.4.9). The 1920 reform was not a Citizens'

League package, nor was it a labour package. It was a *Manitoba Free Press* package, an attempt at compromise brokered by progressive Winnipeg Liberals.

Two additional pieces of evidence help to cement the plausibility of this account of PR adoption in Winnipeg. First, a systematic analysis of newspaper coverage and archival material in Winnipeg *before* the vote to adopt PR in early 1920 reveals patterns of support and opposition that closely resemble the other cities. P.R. was supported in Winnipeg by labour groups, farmers' advocates, veterans' associations, suffragists, and progressive Liberals (Jansen, 1998; see also Online Appendix G). It was resisted, to the limited extent that it was resisted at all, by business elites and conservatives. Just three months before the decisive 1920 vote, labour had included P.R. in its municipal platform alongside other reform measures such as adult suffrage and direct democracy, and Winnipeg's labour aldermen had included P.R. in their package of proposed charter amendments at the end of 1919. Proportional representation in Winnipeg was thus supported by the same basic reform coalition, and undergirded by the same basket of normative arguments, as in Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver (Appendix A.4.10).

Second, and equally revealing, is a council vote on P.R. that occurred a few years later. In 1928, the Winnipeg Board of Trade wrote to city council to request a P.R. plebiscite – a first step in ridding the city of the proportional system – and the request went to a council vote. The vote was cleanly divided along League-labour lines. This time, however, labour was the unanimous defender of P.R., and the Citizens' League was unanimously opposed. The vote included four aldermen who had been on council for the 1920 vote – two from each side – all of whom 'switched' their vote between 1920 and 1928. If proportional representation was a strategic attempt to moderate a labour surge, a 'camouflage' of the city's business elites, no one seems to have told the 1928 Winnipeg city council.

In the end, then, just once in Winnipeg's history, in a single council meeting in March of 1920, did patterns of support and opposition to P.R. fail to resemble those in other Canadian cities. This was not because labour representatives had soured on the idea of P.R.; they publicly supported it before, during, and after the 1920 debate (Appendix A.4.11). Instead, the explanation is simpler: the March 1920 vote was not primarily *about* proportional representation. It was about the right to vote – about a traditionalist coalition seeking to avoid adult suffrage and a labour coalition insisting on adult suffrage at all costs.

Discussion and Conclusion

In keeping with the popularity of Stein Rokkan's account of twentieth-century electoral reform more generally, western Canadian P.R. adoption has been interpreted as a class-oriented rearguard action by urban business elites. The trauma of the Winnipeg General Strike is typically seen as the decisive moment, one that shifted support for P.R. from a fledgling progressive group to the elites who endorsed P.R. on Rokkanian grounds (Pilon, 1996, 2006, 2013). I have argued that there is little evidence to support this interpretation. Instead, P.R. was consistently endorsed and implemented by a coalition of middle-class reformers and leaders in the emerging labour, soldier, women, and farmer movements. Even if local business elites *had* wished to contain

the labour threat, I have argued, their limited knowledge of proportional representation, combined with the relative absence of labour on council at the time of P.R. adoption, meant that strategic action in the P.R. adoption phase was highly constrained.

This argument accords with work by André Blais and others on the significance of the local normative context for understanding patterns of European electoral reform (Blais et al., 2005; Norris, 2011; Renwick, 2010), as well as Damien Bol's (2016) work on electoral reform as a first-order policy commitment of more recent European political parties. However, these arguments about normative pressure and first-order policy commitments should not be taken too far. Each of the studies cited above emphasise the strategic context in which the normative arguments play out: pre-existing institutional structures in Blais; relationships between mass opinion and elite strategy in Norris and Renwick; and a mix of strategic and policy-seeking attitudes in Bol. While these scholars reject the far-reaching strategic logic implied by Rokkan, they readily accept the importance of a more localised strategic environment, one that has been recently explored in a range of European cases by other electoral reform scholars (Andrews & Jackman, 2005; Calvo, 2009; Leemann & Mares, 2014). Those who have taken these 'local strategy' arguments the furthest, however, have explicitly done so in a context in which the likely outcomes of electoral reform are well known to nearly all of the leading actors involved (Leemann & Mares, 2014, p. 463).

The cases of P.R. adoption in western Canadian cities that we have explored above offer a means by which to more explicitly integrate the arguments that have been made in this new work on electoral reform. Programmatic commitments to electoral reform are often a crucial component of P.R. adoption, but these commitments are structured by local experience with existing institutions, including the electoral system, as well as knowledge of the likely outcomes of reform (J. B. Pilet & Bol, 2011). In western Canadian cities, where the normative reputation of electoral reform was high and uncertainty even higher, programmatic commitments dominated processes of electoral reform. As western Canadians learned about the likely effects of the system, however, local strategic knowledge reshaped positions of support and opposition in expected ways. First-order commitments gave way to second-order strategic thinking as the local knowledge necessary for those second-order calculations became available.

Of course, Canadian city councils are very different from European national parliaments. The very features of early-twentieth-century Canadian cities that I have emphasised in my arguments above – the absence of stable political parties and the strategic uncertainties associated with institutional reform – make these cities very different from many European cases of PR adoption, such as Germany (Leemann & Mares, 2014). Despite these differences, however, my argument in this article adds weight to the arguments of those who have challenged the Rokkan thesis in the European context in which it was first developed. In Europe, as in Canadian cities, arguments about proportional representation were deeply intertwined with debates about other forms of institutional change (Blais et al., 2005; Carstairs, 1980), including franchise expansion, creating a normative dimension to electoral reform that may have been more important than is often thought – particularly, as I have argued here, in those places where unstable party systems and limited knowledge made strategic implications unclear. The more that we discover cases in which the Rokkanian calculus does *not* appear to have been particularly important in electoral reform, the more we are able to identify

the specific instances – which may turn out to have been quite rare – when local conditions *did* prompt incumbent elites to adopt PR as a form of institutional self-protection.

This argument also speaks to the value of more specific and in-depth investigations of the ways that local actors actually understood the strategic implications of electoral reform. In some cases, detailed roll-call data, election results, and party manifestos can be combined to estimate strategic expectations without recourse to additional materials. In many cases, however, archival correspondence, newspaper commentary, and other contemporary materials are necessary to clarify the extent to which local actors understood the details of the electoral systems under consideration and the likely effects those systems within their political arena. This approach, whose value I have sought to demonstrate in the context of Canadian subnational reforms, is likely to be equally valuable in other contexts as well.

Notes

1. The system persisted in Calgary and Winnipeg until the post-war period, when it was eliminated as part of a more general interest in replacing at-large with ward-based local electoral systems. Most other Western Canadian cities abolished the system quite quickly, often on the grounds that first-count winners were often identical to eventual winners, making the complicated mechanics of STV unnecessary. I will discuss these abolition processes in more detail in future work; in the meantime, Johnston and Koene (2000) provides an overview.
2. See the beginning of section two for more detail on what made these cities significant in the early twentieth century Anglosphere.
3. The Rokkanian thesis is not *necessarily* a 'left threat' thesis so much as a thesis about strategic responses by incumbents to new parties with rapidly increasing popularity. However, both the original thesis and Dennis Pilon's adapted version emphasize that the threat was one from the left.
4. A third challenge has been offered from a political-economic perspective by Thomas Cusack and his co-authors in Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 2007. I do not address this challenge for two reasons. First, the Cusack et al. argument has not withstood empirical scrutiny; see Kreuzer, 2010 and Leemann & Mares, 2014. Second, and relatedly, the Cusack et al. argument assumes a level of strategic foresight which is even greater than that assumed by Rokkan, and it is therefore even more susceptible to the counter-arguments described below than is the Rokkan thesis.
5. See online appendix A for full timelines. For examples of inspiration, see *Proportional Representation Review* April 1914, pp.39-41; April 1916, pp.31-36; July 1916, p.65; July 1917, p.68; July 1919, pp.57-59; April 1920, p.28; October 1920, p.71.
6. For more detail on these roll call data, see Online Appendix C.
7. A simple bivariate OLS analysis suggests that a one percent increase in district-level support for labour is associated with a 2.2 percent increase in district-level support for franchise expansion. This single variable explains 20 percent of the variation in district-level support for the franchise plebiscite. See online appendix H for more detail.
8. Because I will deal with Winnipeg separately below, I have excluded the Winnipeg arguments from this table; the full table including Winnipeg is available in Online Appendix D.
9. Both the arguments for and against electoral reform in these cities bear some important resemblances to academic and popular debates on electoral reform today. For a sample of the contemporary discussion, see Carey & Hix, 2011 and, in Canada, Potter, Weinstock, & Loewen, 2017.
10. See Online Appendices C and D for specific sources and examples of these arguments. See Online Appendix F for details on similar arguments and evidence for a similar coalitional structure at the federal scale in Canada.

11. See online Appendix E for detail on data sources for this figure.
12. Calgary's first labor majority was in 1922, five years after P.R. had been adopted; Edmonton's first labor majority was in 1927, after P.R. was abolished; Winnipeg's first labor majority was not until 1934; Vancouver never had a labor majority.
13. One of Dafoe's concerns in 1919 and 1920 was to provide room for moderate labor voices in Winnipeg politics in order to dampen the polarization that had occurred in the aftermath of the General Strike (and to which his own paper had certainly contributed). He felt that STV would strengthen these moderate voices. This would advantage a particular *sort* of labor representative, and weaken more radical labor voices, but it was not motivated by an attempt to exclude labor from council. See *Manitoba Free Press* November 29, 1919, p. 9; December 5, 1919, p. 1.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to David Stewart, Cameron Anderson, Robert Lieberman, Thomas Ogorzalek, and Jack Santucci for very helpful conversation and feedback as this manuscript developed. I am also grateful to SSHRC and the Calgary Institute for the Humanities for financial support and to Mark Grosjean for research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada: [grant number 430-2016-00048].

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Appendix: Archival and Unpublished Sources

To avoid overwhelming the main text with lengthy parenthetical citations to lists of archival materials, I have compiled all references to archival materials, as well as extended lists of newspaper articles, in this appendix.

- A.3.1. See February 1919 *Daily Province* clipping in Garfield King Fonds (AM135), City of Vancouver Archives; February 21, 1919 Board of Trade Retail Committee Report, File 14 – Vancouver, Box 70, *P*.R. League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library; and Vancouver *Sun* September 19, 1919.
- A.3.2. For Calgary, see *Calgary Herald* December 12, 1916, *p*.1 and December 13, 1916, *p*.5. For Edmonton, see *Edmonton Journal* December 12, 1922, *p*.4 and Hunt to Hallett, January 3, 1923, File 6 – Alberta, Box 1, *P*.R. League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library. For Vancouver, see Volume 1 (87-G1), Series S37, City of Vancouver Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.
- A.3.3. For a sample of the important role of wards in Vancouver's electoral reform debates, see *Vancouver Sun* September 19, 1919; *Daily Province* November 19, 1919, *p*.10; December 16, 1919, *p*.20.
- A.3.4. Vancouver *Sun*, July 9, 1919, in Garfield King Scrapbook, AM 135 (Garfield King Fonds), City of Vancouver Archives.
- A.3.5. For examples from Belgium, see *Albertan* January 29, 1916, *p*.10 and Winnipeg *Tribune* March 12, 1920, *p*.7; as well as the transcripts in 'Report of a Committee of the Legislature on Election Laws' (C131 1916B) and the Secretary's frustration concerning the Belgium example in his final report, in Miscellaneous Reports (G8077), Attorney General Central Registry Operations and Programs Files, Provincial Archives of Manitoba. For *incorrect examples* see references to Cleveland and Toledo in *Albertan* January 20, 1916, *p*.8; Tasmania and 'other British colonies' in *Albertan* February 9, 1916, *p*.1. For *grouping together places with varying systems*, see for example references to Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Holland, and Australia in *Albertan* January 29, 1916, *p*.10; Sweden, South Africa, and Tasmania in *Province* November 8, 1916, *p*.10. For *surprisingly limited knowledge* of *P*.R. systems elsewhere in Canada, see John Hunt's report on Canadian *P*.R. to George Hallett December 18, 1926, File 6 – Alberta, Box 1, Proportional Representation League Fonds (MS1029), Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library.
- A.3.6. Halpenny to Miller, October 29, 1919; Peart to Miller, December 2, 1919; Simpson to Miller January 22, 1921; all in City Clerk's Correspondence, City of Calgary Archives.
- A.3.7. Examples include *Albertan* January 20, 1916, *p*.8; Vancouver *Sun*, December 4, 1920, *p*.6; *Edmonton Journal* April 12, 1922, *p*.4.
- A.3.8. Undated note, 1920, R.A.C. Manning calculations, in File 3A – Citizens' League 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds (MG 14 B36), Provincial Archives of Manitoba.
- A.3.9. Miller to Ross and Angers, September 9, 1920, File 962, Box 140, Clerk's Correspondence, City Clerk's Fonds, Calgary Archives.

- A.3.10. Vancouver *Province*, October 24, 1917 (page number illegible). King to Hallett, April 20, 1920, in File 14 – Vancouver, Box 70, Proportional Representation League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library.
- A.3.11. Weaver to Hallett, November 3, 1927, in File 8 – Edmonton, Box 22, Proportional Representation League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library.
- A.3.12. Cross to Hallett, March 21, 1923; Nealands to Hallett, March 27, 1923; both in File 14 – Vancouver, Box 70, *P*.R. League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library.
- A.3.13. *Edmonton Journal* December 6, 1927, *p*.4; December 13, 1927, *p*.4; Weaver to Hallett, November 3, 1927 and Kilburn to Hallett, October 29, 1927, both in File 8 – Edmonton, Box 22, *P*.R. League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library.
- A.3.14. Owen to Hallett, December 15, 1928; File 8 – Edmonton, Box 22, Proportional Representation League Fonds, Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscript Library.
- A.4.1. Manitoba Free Press, March 16, 1920, *p*.1. For a later reference, see the (factually inaccurate!) speech to Parliament of the Hon. Abraham Albert Heaps, June 2, 1926, available at http://www.lipad.ca/full/permalink/792089/.
- A.4.2. Kathleen O'Gorman, 'The Winnipeg Civic Elections of 1919 and 1920 – A Comparison', File 23 (Winnipeg Subject Files), Alan Artibise Fonds (P2272), Provincial Archives of Manitoba.
- A.4.3. For the first labour move: *Manitoba Free Press* September 30, 1919, *p*.11; October 15, 1919, *p*.1; also Winnipeg Council Minutes, October 14, 1919; City Clerk to Legislation and Reception Committee, October 15, 1919 (Vertical Files – Elections: Historical, City of Winnipeg Archives); City Clerk to City Solicitor, October 25, 1919 (File 5, Civic Affairs 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds, Provincial Archives of Manitoba). For the second labour proposal: Winnipeg City Council Minutes, November 24, 1919. Also *Manitoba Free Press* November 8, 1919, p1; November 12, 1919, p1; November 22, 1919, p12; November 25, 1919, p3 and 10. Also 'Tentative Report on Adult Voting Qualification,' November 6, 1919; Committee on Legislation and Reception Minutes, November 11, 1919 (File 5: Civic Affairs 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds, Provincial Archives of Manitoba).
- A.4.4. Citizens' League early reaction: Mills to Manning, December 4, 1919; Special Committee Minutes, December 8, 1919; both in File 5 – Civic Affairs 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds, Provincial Archives of Manitoba. Development and details of Citizens' League proposal: Committee Proposals, December 15, 1919 and Sub-Committee Recommendations, December 15, 1919, both in File 5 – Civic Affairs 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds, Provincial Archives of Manitoba.
- A.4.5. Public statements of these positions: *Manitoba Free Press* February 4, 1920, p1; February 7, 1920, p13; *Winnipeg Tribune* February 2, 1920, p1; February 7, 1920, p8; February 9, 1920, p5.
- A.4.6. *Manitoba Free Press* March 5, 1920, p14, March 16, 1920, p1, and *Winnipeg Tribune* March 12, 1920, p6, as well as Richards to Manning, March 4, 1920, File 5 Civic Affairs 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds, Provincial Archives of Manitoba.
- A.4.7. *Manitoba Free Press* March 5, 1920, p14. Citizens' League representatives investigated proportional representation in late 1919 and early 1920 (see Miller to Halpenny, October 31, 1919, File 925/Box 133 and Miller to Manning, February 2, 1920, File 962/Box 140, both in City Clerk's Correspondence, Clerk's Fonds, City of Calgary Archives) but never expressed support for the system. Manning's personal calculations suggested that the League would have better results under a plurality system; see his back-of-the-envelope calculations in File 3A – Citizens' League, R.A.C. Manning Fonds, Provincial Archives of Manitoba.
- A.4.8. Winnipeg Council Minutes, March 15, 1920; Also Manitoba Free Press, March 16, 1920, p1 and Winnipeg Tribune, March 16, 1920, *p*.10.
- A.4.9. Undated note, 1920, R.A.C. Manning calculations, in File 3A – Citizens' League 1919-20, R.A.C. Manning Fonds (MG 14 B36), Provincial Archives of Manitoba. *Winnipeg Tribune* March 22, 1920, *p*.5.
- A.4.10. *Manitoba Free Press* October 25, 1919, *p*.22.
- A.4.11. *Winnipeg Tribune* March 22, 1920, *p*.5.